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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD DONE, dba,
DONE EQUIPMENT COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
RONALD L. BUSHMAN, dba,
SMOOT'S CORNER,
Defendant.

)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

Case No. 14623

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This case was filed by Harold Done, dba, Done Equipment Company of
Delta, County of Millard; State of Utah, who is a dealer in

fa~~- equi~~ent

and

machinery, vs. Ronald L. Bushman, dba Smoot' s Corner, of Marysvale, Piute
County, State of Utah, also a machine dealer.
The action involves the sale of certain used tr.actor and trencher:- Vl(hich
the plaintiff had available for sale.

The plaintiff alleges that on the 16th day of

March, 1974, the defendant called plaintiff about the purchase of.said equipment.
On the 18th of March, defendant made a trip to De~ta and ,examined the equipment.
On the 20th day of March, he negotiated on the telephone, the sale of ~h_e _MF202
Everett trencher for $4,350.00 to be delivered.

On the 22nd of March, 1974,

plaintiff delivered the tractor and trencher to the defendant at Marysvale, and
demonstrated it as desired by the defendant~ and received th~ check which had been
made out by the defendant after the telephone conversation of March 20th; that
sales tax was waived because the sale was to the defendant, a dealer. T_he ter-
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honored or the funds stopped.
The defendant's Answer admits the equipment was examined by the defendant on the 18th day of March, 1974 and purchase was discussed on the 20th
of March, and the equipment demonstrated on March 22nd, when it was accepte:
and paid for.

Defendant claims that was upon the false and fraudulent represent·

ations of the plaintiff.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Di.strict Court rendered judgment:

No cause of action against the

plaintiff.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
For Reversal of the Judgment of the District Court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Harold Done, dba, Done Equipment Company was at all tirn°
a dealer in farm equipment and machinery, and was an owner of a certain FM 20;
Everett trencher and tractor.
That on or about March 16th, 1974, the defendant Ronald L. Bushmanphcr
ed plaintiff from hi.s place of business at Smoot's Corner at Marysvale, Utah, as·
ing if the trencher and tractor were fo~ sale.

(TR 4, Lin~ 1O) The defendant,

after examining equipment at Delta on the 18th of March, called the plaintiff,
Harold Done on the telephone on or about the 20th of March, and asked plaintiff if
he would accept $3, 000. 00, which he had offered employee at the ti.me he examine:
the equipment in Delta.
$4 350 00

T

Plaintiff advised he would not.

That he would sell it for
·

t

h

woul:

he Law
defendant
asked
if plaintiff
would
i.ver
equipment;
e
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the plaintiff and his mechanic, Eldon Shurtz to the defendant at Smoot's Corner
at Marysvale on March 22, 1974.
After the machinery was unloaded, defendant wanted to see it run;
Lines 8 through 16).

(TR 9,

Plaintiff's version of the incident was according to his

testimony:
Q:

Describe who did what.

A:

Eldon, my mechanic backed it off the truck, then Ron and I was
standing off to the side, talking. Eldon and the two men run
the machine and Mr. Bushman never got on it. I never got
on it. We dug a trench, I would say 15 feet maybe 20, and
then one of the men took the front-end dozer and filled two
trenches in and Ron asked me if it was in good shape and I
said, "Yes, it is in good shape."· He said, "Will it dig rocks,"
and we had just been digging rocks and gravel, and I said,
"Sure, within limitation, if you get a rock big;ier than the
bucket it worlt, you have to shove your clutch in and get that
rock out of it." All machines have a limitation; it has a limitation too, it can only take a certain size rock through the
bucket. (TR 9 Lines 15 through 30)

Q:

Now when you say you have got parts, from where?

A:

"rhere is a place in California and one in Illinois. I don't have
the addresses but my wife has the information or the telephone
numbers and we got parts there." And he says, "Fine, Come
up and I will give you a check. " And then the other men drove
it, (the trencher) back around the front of the building. (TR 10,
Lin es 5 through 9)

A Bill of Sale, Exhibit No. One, dated March 22, 1974 was delivered·
to defendant, which provided for no sales tax because of the dealers' status of.the
defendant.

(TR 1 o, Line 22) The defendant delivered to the plaintiff, a check

drawn on the account of Smoot's Corner at the Valley Central Bank, Richfield,
Utah.
Exhibit No. Two, a check, which is dated '3-20-74', which is a date followin;i the
telephone
and
two days
previous
to theof delivery
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demonstration on March 22, 197 4.
On the following dav, Saturday the 23rd of March, plaintiff's bookkeeper
I

Ruth Done mailed the check for deposit.

(TR 37, Lines 28 through Page 38,

Line 1 ) Subsequently and on the 23rd of March, 197 4, defendant telephoned the
plaintiff relative to the addresses of the parts houses and the plaintiff referred
him to the bookkeeper.

The bookkeeper, Ruth Done testified that on the 23rd of

March, 1974, she had a telephone conversation with Ronald L. Bushman, who
wanted the name of the company or the telephone number where he could get part
The. conversation according to the plaintiff was as follows:
Q:

_A:

And do you remember what you said to him and what he said
to you on that occasion?
I just told him, "Wait a minute and I will go get the paper that
had the information on it. It was Peoria, Illinois and Costa
Mesa, California.

Q:

And what had been your e~perience so far as Uuse companies were
concerned, what had been your relationship with them on parts
and equipment?

A:

We had ordered some chainlinks and a little digger, I don't
.know what you call them, knives from those when we came
in off the job from Gyser Ranch when we repaired it, got jt
back,, but as far as the bearings, I think we got those out of
Salt Lake, which we get chainlinks there as well.

Q:

Had you had any problem at that time getting any equipment
or parts for the equipment that you had requested at any
. time?

A:

We hadn't needed anything other than the little digger knives
and the chainli.nks which are wear i terns.

Q:

So, as far as you know, are you sti. ll able to get them?

A:

Still able to get those, they are universal type parts. Any
bearing supply house in Salt Lake, I think, can get you the
chainlinks, belt, as well as the chainlinJf.s and the bearings.
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Q:

Did you have any other discussion or conversation with
Mr. Bushman relative to what parts were or were not
available?

A:

No. I just gave him the number where we obtained these parts.
(TR 39, Lines 14 through 23 )

The address of the parts house as read to the defendant from catalog supplement was and is:
Peoria, Illinois,

Little Giant Products Inc., 1600 Northeast Adams Street,

61601, Telephone: 309-673-9091.

On cross-examination defendant asked Mrs. Done if there was a discussion
in which she was requested not to deposit the check, and she answered:

"No Sir,

there wasn't." (TR 40, Line 21 )
The action of the defendant was louder and more convincing than is even
the statements of the defendant, such actions are:
A.

Defendant wanted to see the ·equipment and make his appraisal of its

suitabil Hy for his purposes.

He drove to Del ta and found the plaintiff's employee

and made such personal inspection as he cared to. and offered the plaintiff's
employee $3, 000. 00 purchase price. ( TR 44, Line 11 )
B.

Defendant telephoned the plaintiff on March 20, advising that he had

seen the equipment and negotiated with the plaintiff for its delivery for.the sum of
I

$4,350.00, which excluded sales tax.

(TR 46, Lines 20 through 22) ·

C. When equipment was delivered on March 22, 1974, plaintiff's mechanic
showed the defendant's operator how to operate the gears and dig a trench. The
defendant's operator filled in a 22 foot trench and the defendant expressed satisfaction and delivered to the plaintiff, the check for $4,350.00,

Defendant has made

several references in his testimony that the trencher was going to be used in
Sponsored
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testimony stated that the demonstration made of the equipment on March 22, 1974
at defendant's place of business was " •• rather an easy demonstration." (TR 48

'

Line 10) But it is important to note that the plaintiff complied with every request
made by the defendant at the time that it was delivered and that there was not and
could not be an express warranty on used equipment sold on inspection.

Both were

dealers of machinery and equipment and both knew that all machinery has limitations with regards to performance.

The defendant's allegations of express war-

ranty and/or fraud are no stronger than his own testimony as determined on cross·
examination. (TR 71 , Line 10)
Q:

You wanted to see it operate when you talked to him on or
about the 20th of March, is that right?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And so he brought it over for you to see it operate, is that.
correct?

A:

Yes, he brought it over. He had assured me that the
machine would do what it would do.

Q:

But did he bring it over and show you like he said he would?

A:

_Yes, he did.

Q:

And did you have your 'equipment operator there?

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

And did you see it operate?

A:

Yes, I did.

Q:

And did your equipment operator operate it?

A:

No, th~y qid not.

Q:

Did they have an opportunity--

A: The trencher part?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A:

Q:

Yes, one of my equipment operators did use the backfill blade on
the front of the machine to push the trench back in.
D}d they deny you any use of the machine that you wanted to make
it wi.th your operators?

of'
!'>(

No, they di.d not, the machine itself did, however.

Q:

So you were given a free use of the equipment?

Comment by the Court.
Q:

Di.d he permit you the full use and demonstration that you
wanted of the equipment?

Q:

Did MR. Done?

A:

Yes.

Q:

All right. And when he got over there did you tell him that
you were satisfied and that there was a check up at the station
for t-)im?

A:
· Q:

Yes, I di.d.
.And is this the check that had been made out on March 20th,
the date that you had talked to hi.m on the telephone?

A: Yes I did.
l't

'•

-

Defendant· further testified on cross-examination as to a conversation he
had with K.ichard G. Spurlin who was an associate with Dixon Corporation, relati.ve to repair parts.

Mr. Spurlin had be~n referred to him by the Little Giant

Products Company of Peoria, Illinois, whom the Done Equipment Company bookkeeper had advised defendant that they had received parts from.

The following

'

i.s the testimony of a conversation that the defendant Ronald Bushman had regarding parts:
Q:

(TR 75, L i.ne 15 through 30 )
Have you ever had correspondence with Richard Spurlin?

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Q:

And did you ask him relative to replacements, chains,'
sprockets, bearings, conveyor belting, hydraulic motor,
pump cylinder, repair bushings and shafts?

A:

Yes sir, I did.

Q:

And did he tell you that those are the main items we try to
· have made up and on hand?

A:

Yes sir, they do that now.

Q:

Then these parts are available, are they not?

A:

They are now, sir, yes.

Q:

Well, if they are now they would be then, if you ·had made the
proper inquiry, would they not?

A:

I talked to the same man then, they were not then available sir.

Q:

Is that Mr. Done's fault if the parts man was temporarily
out of something that you wanted, is that Mr. Done's fault?

A:

Dixon Corporation had just taken over the line, sir. Little
Giant Products had gone out of business and Dixon Corporation had just taken over the line.

Q:

It is not your contention, is it, that Mr. Done made any fraudulent statement to you; he told you that he had been able to obtain parts. Parts are still obtainable. The equipment can
still be operated by these items which you have described as
wanting when you caused the equipment to break, isn't that a
fact?
·' '
'· ',' ,.

THE COURT: Is this a question?
Q:

Let me rephrase that.
not?

A:

Some of them, yes sir.

Q~·

~earings can be obtained?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Shafts can be obtained?

A:

Yes sir.

pushings can be obtained, can they
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Q:

Sprockets can be obtained?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

Conveyor, belting?

A:

Yes sir.

Q:

What else do you need?

A:

We need a specific bushing that goes inside the slip clutch
which Dixon Corporation has not been able to obtain.
(TR 75, Line l!3 through 30, page 76 1 Line l through 30
page 77, Line l through 3 )
'

It is submitted that by any reasonable effort, defendant could have obtained
repair parts or have had them made by ,a precision machine shop.' The testimony
of the defendant does confirm that the plaintiff Harold Done did not make any false
or fraudulent representation, either as to where he obtained parts or as to his use
and the condition he krnw pf the equipll\ent.
The defendant Ronald Bushman made no reasonable effort.to operate· the
equipment or to mitigate any damages.

He was a dealer, yet after the bucket had

been sprung he merely took some pictures,' to show that' some gears or bearings or
some other part of the equipment had been worn.
No. 6 1 by which he atte'mpts to

e~tablish

He tQok a picture marked Exhibit

the removal of a slip c'lutch but when asked

on cross-examination, about Exhibit No. 6, makes the following reply:
Lines 23 thro'ugh 30)

(TR 78,

(TR 79, Lines l through 30)

Q:

Now, what are ~ome of the reasons or purposes that this piece
of equipment or part here~ ( indicq ting ) couldn't be replaced
with a larger bearing?

A:

Could be, yes.

Q:

Not necessarily the removal of any slip clutch or so forth?

A:

Well, not necessarily.

Q:

So this Exhibit No. 6 1 where you have pointed to some cutting
in the framework here, (indicating), is not necessarily indicative of removing a slip clutch, is it?

t~st!fying
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COURT: Well, you went into the slip clutch and whether or not it
had been removed, it is cross-examination, overruled, Do you
understand the question? Restate the question.

Q:

This cutting could have been for several reasons, to replace
this sprocket or gear (indicating ) could it not?

A:

Could have been.

Q: To place a larger one there?
A:

Yes •.

Q:

Repa'ir the bearing?

A:.

Yes.

Q:

A:

Now, is it not pos~ible that in this area (indicating) there are,
and I point out here (indicating), that there are shearer bolts
which would have been in lieu of a slip clutch?
Yes sir.

Q: And shear bolts right here (indicating) would have served the
same purposes as a slip clutch, would they not?
A: : No sir, they would not.
Q:

But they would have stopped the equipment if there had been
shear bolts here, (indicating), it would serve the same pur- pose that_ a slip clutch would, is that correct? ·

A: .If there had been, yes.
(TR 78, Lines 23 through 30, page 79, page 80, Lines l and 2)
-

Neither defendant or plaintiff knew whether equipment had slip _clutch or shear
pins'--nor was it discussed by them.

The facts are that the defendant, damaged the

'
bucket while he was lettin:;J the equipment self-operate 1 then permitted the trencher
and tractor to remain on his premises, doin;J nothing to repair it or to mitigate loss
or damage until December 5, 1974, eight mont!1s later, when h'? cleli Jared the equip.mc:i.r_bacl< to the plaiTt,iffin a gestur2 of ::;.m.::hiding his r.:ispon.;ibility and without
any con!;ent for redelivery by the plaintiff 1 placing the plaintiff at a financial dis-

.

'

advantage. The only notice of terminating the agreement was return of the check·1
(Exhibit No. 2) rnarl<ed insufficient funds on or

~bo~t

March 26th, and the return

of the Sales Tax Waiver April S, 1976.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE: The Court erred in making the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which findings are not supported by the evidence:
1.

Finding number one, the "Everett trencher was sold for the defendant's use at Marysvale, Piute County area."

2.

Finding number two, that the trencher was in good condition and
parts and materials for the machine were readily available. '

3.

Finding number three, that the machine was suitable for use in the
1V1arysvale area and could work in rocky ground.

I-A There was no clear and convincing evidence of fraud.
The defendant in his Answer in paragraph "C" and "D" asks for termination of
the contract on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation.

(File

s3 )

But there is

great variance in his pleading and his proof.
The defense of fraud and misrepresentation is an affirmative defense and in
order to have a sale voided for fraud, the defendant has the burden of establishing by
clear and convincing proof and not by suspicion or innuendo, (Lundstrom vs. Radio
Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P 2d 339) that the seller had a preconceived intention to practice deception upon the buyer.
The Supreme Court has in numerous cases, including Pace vs. Parish, 122
Utah 141; 247 P 2d 273; and in Fleming vs. Fleming Felt Company, 7 Utah 2d 293;
323 P 2d 712, has stated that the essential elements of fraud include a knowing false
representation made by the seller of a presently existing material fact, upon which
the buyer relied to his peril.
inspection or inquiry.

That the buyer did, infact, not rely on independant

That the buyer did, infact, exercise reasonable care and

prudence before entering into the transaction.

(Schow vs. Guardstone, Inc., 18

Utah 2d 135; 417 2d 643)
The defendant: a dealer in equipment, first on March 16, 1974, asked to
see and "'"z·mir,e the equipment.

(TR 6, Line 9 and 10) He next did examine it on

plaintiff's yard on Iviarch 18, 1974.

(TR 44, Line 12 through 15 ) He made an offer

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to buy the tractor and trencher in a telephone call initlated by him on tv1arch 20th,
1974.

(TR 45, Lines 7 through 30 ), and he wanted the equipment delivered to

Marysvale and wanted to see it run.

(TR 46, Line 20)

The equipment was delivered to tv1arysvale on tviarch 22, 1974.
lt run.

He did see

He also had two operators present who participated in operating the equip-

ment. The plaintiff did not deny him any use, demonstration or inspection he
wanted to maKe.
get hls check.

(TR 72, Line 14) He told plaintiff he was satisfied, to come and
(TR 72, Line l through 15) The defendant had every reasonable

opportunity to inquire about the equipment from tv1arch 16th through tv1arch 22nd.
There was no high pressure or perf:uasive or agressive sales pitch used on the de·
fendant nor could there have been.
He, intact, made every approach.

He knew what he wanted and how to obtain it.
And if the court should set aside this sale be-

cause the defendant subsequently thought he had made a bad bargain, few dealers
could sell used equipment.
The Supreme Court has said that the mere fact that the party may have made
a bad bargain will not support a charge of fraud.

(Schow vs. Guardstone, Ibid)

Quoting from 37 Arn Jur Zd, Section 237 1 where a party to whom representations are made is put •1pon inquiry by his knowledge of the facts and undertakes
to make an investigation of his own, and the other party does nothing to prevent
this investigation from being as full as the investigator chooses to make it, and
in the transaction the trne facts are equally open to both upon investigation, the
investigator will not usually be heard to say that he had the right to rely on such
representations.

The doctrine of caveat emptor is recognized and applied where

there is investigation or inspection by a purchaser.
1-B There is insufficient preponderance of evidence from which the Co_!:!!:t

could find warranty.
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B: The pleadings and the evidence were insufficient to Justify a finding
of express or implied warranty.
'
Even though the defendant did not plead a specific
breach of warranty in

his Answer, or set it up as an allegation of defense, his testimony alluded to breach
of an express or i mplir3 l warranty as a defonse along with his ciai:n of fra· 1 j

.

1

-,d

rnisre pre se nta ti on and objection is raised to the variance between the allegations
and the proof, but breac.h of warranty didnot exist in the instant case. The law
respecting express and impl~ed warranties has been modified by the provisions of
the Uniform Sales Act and more especially by the Uniform Corrunercial Code. And
the Code at 70 A-2-316 provides:
'

"When the buyer before entering into a contract, has examined
the goods or the' sample or model as fully as he desires, or has
refused to examine the goods, there is no implied warranty with
regard to defects which an examination ought, in the circumstances,
to have revealed to him."
Defendant examined the equipment as fully as he desired (TR 72, Line 14)
and told plaintiff to_ come and get the check.'

(J;R 73,, Line l through lS) On the

nearest thing to a warranty the plaintiff described to the defendant orally, uses
'

'
that he had made of the equipment, reporting it to b.e in good working
condition.
The defendant determined that it was in working condition and even if there had been
no inspection or examination, there we~e no expres~ warranties made by the plaintiff
on this second hand equipment upon which the defendant relied at his peril.
In a similar case of Tibbetts & Pleasant v. Fairfax, 145,
Oklahoma 2 ll, 2 92, P 9, it was held that the principle that
there is no implied warranty in the purchase of second hand machinery
was applicable in the case under consideration, wherein it appeared that a highway contractor purchased a second hand road-oiler
wagon from a municipality after its representative had seen and
inspected the machine, the court observing that it appeared from
the nature of the purchaser's business that he would have a better
Judgment than the municipality as to the performance of the
machine in the work for which it was p,urchased.
Where a second hand aeroplane was purchased by an expert on
aeroplane motors, and it appeared that before making the purchase
he knew that it was a second hand machine used as a demonstrator,
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(Zd) 893, that the purchaser could not avoid payment of the note
forming a portion of the purchase price upon the ground of a breach
of an implied warranty, the court saying: "Where an expert, buying
a second hand article, tests the article and relies on his own knowledge, he deals with equal opportunity with the salesman, and there
is no implied warranty. A warranty may be implied only where the
buyer has no opportunity to inspect the article before accr~pt[nJ' it."
And it was hcild Ln 11.'ua-rican Soda Fountain Company v. Palace
Drug Store (1922; Texas Civ App) 245 SW 1032, that there was no
implied warranty in the sale of a used soda fountain where there was
no misrepresentation and no concealment of any facts known to the
seller, the seller was not the manufacturer thereof, and the l::luyer
knew that he was buying a second hand fountain, and that the fountain
delivered was of the kind and description sold, the court saying that
the case under consideration was subject to the general rule that there
is no implied warranty in the sale of second hand goods. The court
·took. this view, notwithstanding the fact that the buyer didnot inspect
the fountain before it was accepted, it appearing, however, that he
accepted and used it and merely complained that the syrup cups were
out of order by reason of certain screws being worn, and that the ice
cream cabiqet leaked. It is pointed out that it was not shown that the
buyer ever lost a sale by reason of these minor defects, which could
have been repaired in ,a short time and at a small cost. (Compare
'Buffalo Pitts Co. v. Alderdice (1915); Tex Civ App) 177 SW 1044 infra,
lI c 6.)
, There is no implied warranty of the condition of a second hand
automobile. l\!1oore v. Switzer, 78 Colo 63, 239 P 874; Williams v.
McClain (1937) 180 Miss 6, 176 So 717. 151 ALR 448.
, And it was said in Henry v. Kennard (1936) 178 Okla s68, 62P
(2d) 1184, that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies in the sale of a
second hand automobile, and there is no 'implied warranty of quality or
fitness.
Another case Where the facts are very similar is Morely v. Consolidated
Manufacturing Company, 81 NE 993, where plaintiff purchased an
automobile which he was informed had been used as a demonstrating
car, and the amount paid therefor was about one half the price for a
new one of the same make. There was no implied warranty as to the
length Qf tirqe the crankshaft in the automobile would last when sold
by the company, which dealt in the sale of automobiles, the court saying: "The subject of sale was an automobile. Even if it be assumed
that the plaintiff had, the right to think the sale was made by the manufacturer, still the machine was not made especially for the plaintiff,
but on the contrary, was which had been considerably used and knew
was a sum below the usual price. If it be sal:d that he had the right to
suppose it was fit to run, the answer is that it was fit to run. Every
part essential to the running of the machine was there at the time of
the purchase. In other words, the machine was an automobile in running
order, and after the purchase was actually used by the plaintiff nearly
if not quite two months before the shaft broke. If the shaft had been
stronger it might have lasted for a longer time. Under these circumsta.nces
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we think thiJt _there was no implied warranty as to the length of time the
shaft would lc-i;;t,. but as to that, the doctrine of caveat empto i
11
r s app cable::." 67 Am Jur 2d; Section 433, page 59 5
POINT TWO: Dcfenc .:int is es topped by inaction and latches.
It was lviarcli 16, 1974 when defendant inquired about purchasing equipment.
It was March 18, 1974 when defendant made a trip from Marysvale to Delta
I

to examine the equipment.

On March 18th he made an offer to plaintiff and his employee of $3,000.00
to purchase the tractor and trencher.
On March 20, 1974 in a telephone conversation to the plaintiff he agreed to
pay $4,350.00 for the equipment if delivered and demonstrated.
On March 22, 1974 the tractor and trencher were delivered and demonstrated.
And on the same date delivered the check for the purchase price.
Plaintiff sent the check to the bank on March 23, 1974. On the 26th it was
returned dishonored.

Defendant drew his money out of the bank rather than settle

his differences with plaintiff.
Defendant called plaintiff's wife in June, 1974, and advised her that he would
return the equipment.
plaintiff.

She told him those arrangements would need be made with the

Defendant re turned the tractor and trencher without arrangement on December

5, 1974, and should be es topped from damaging plaintiff by his vacillating.
CONCLUSIONS
Defendant admits the purchase of the equipment at the price represented.

He

has the affirmative burden of establishing a defense by a preponderance of clear and
convincing evidence.

In this he failed and the lower Court should be reversed.
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